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Never were there two opinions in the world alike,
no more than two kaires or two graines. Diversity is
the most universal quality. -Montaigne.
INTRODUCTION
In discussing a case that involves the relationship between
the civil and the military power it is interesting to note the
gradual development of the civil power. Great Britain
evolved into a state as a result of a merger of small military
units. Naturally the military power was recognized at that
time and for a considerable period thereafter as the supreme
power. The civil power, then in its incipiency, gradually
grew until Magna Charta gave it due recognition; and from
that time on, as the Petition of Right and the Bill of Rights
show, it grew in importance. The transition resulting from
the contraction of the military and Zne expansion of the civil
power brought forth a new philosophy of *government, the
supremacy of the civil power. The American colonists, im-
bued with this doctrine, predicated the Declaration of In-
dependence upon it. In this great document the people stated
as one of their grievances that the King "has affected to ren-
der the military independent of, and superior to, the civil
power." The Articles of Confederation and the Constitution
and Bill of' Rights likewise manifest the intention of the
founding fathers to rest our government on the principle of
civil supremacy. A corollary of this American constitutional
theory is that the jurisdiction of the civil courts is supreme.
A further corollary is that a civilian has a constitutional right
to demand a public and speedy trial by jury in the civil
courts. Dr. Edward Jenks, an eminent legalist, states, "More-
over, where there is a conflict of jurisdiction, the civilian
jurisdiction prevails." 1
1 JExs, THE NEW JuRISPRUDENcE (1933) 256.
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This brief summary of the rise of civil power led to the
following discussion between a professor and a student about
one of the most famous trials in the United States, the Lin-
coln Conspiracy Trial.
STUDENT: What was this famous trial?
PROFESSOR: It was the trial of eight conspirators leagued
with John Wilkes Booth in the assassination of President
Lincoln and the attempted assassination of the Honorable
William H. Seward, Secretary of State.2 Immediately after
the death of President Lincoln, Secretary of War Stanton
announced in an official bulletin that all persons who had
harbored or secreted Booth and his aids or assisted their
escape should be subject to trial before a military commis-
sion. Booth was captured in Garrett's barn near Port Royal,
Virginia, and died on Garrett's porch about four hours later,
April 24, 1865. Arrested as his co-conspirators were David
E. Herold, George A. Atzerodt, Lewis Payne, Michael 0'-
Laughlin, Edward Spangler, Samuel Arnold, Mrs. Mary E.
Surratt, and Dr. Samuel A. Mudd. They were brought to
trial on May 10, 1865, before a military commission of nine
officers convoked by order of President Andrew Johnson,
following an opinion of Attorney-General Speed. This pro-
ceeding was based upon the theory that the assassination of
Lincoln was a military crime. Instead of a secret military
trial, the defendants demanded, as civilians, a public trial
by jury in the District of Columbia civil courts, which were
then open and functioning. The military commission sus-
tained its own jurisdiction and proceeded with the trial.
The trial continued for several weeks, and on July 5, 1865,
President Johnson approved the commission's findings or-
dering four of the defendants to be imprisoned and four to
be executed.8 On July 7, 1865, the date set for the hanging,
2 Prrm, ASSASsNATION OF PRESIDENT LINcouN AND TRIAL OF THE CoN-
sPIRATORS (1865); POORE, ThE CONSPmACY TRIAl (1865); DEWrrT, ThE ASSASSI-
NATION OF ABRAHAm LnrcoN (1909).
8 PumAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 249.
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Mary E. Surratt applied to Judge Wylie of the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia for a writ of habeas corpus.
The writ was issued by Judge Wylie and made returnable
before the criminal court of the District of Columbia at ten
o'clock that morning.' Instead of obeying the writ and pro-
'ducing the person of Mary E. Surratt at ten o'clock, Major-
General Hancock, accompanied by Attorney-General Speed,
appeared before Judge Wylie at eleven-thirty o'clock that
morning without Mary E. Surratt, because President John-
son had suspended the writ. Judge Wylie yielded to the sus-
pension of the writ,,' and Mary E. Surratt, David E. Herold,
George A. Atzerodt, and Lewis Payne were hanged that af-
ternoon. The other four were sent to the federal prison (Dry
Tortugas) in Florida. In 1867 O'Laughlin died during an
epidemic of yellow fever which swept the prison; and in
1869 Dr. Mudd, Samuel Arnold, and Edward Spangler were
pardoned by President Johnson. Incidentally, a story of the
Lincoln Conspiracy Trial would be incomplete without a
reference to the fact that the small diary removed from
Booth's pocket at his capture was not included with the other
Booth effects introduced at the trial of the co-conspirators,
and without a reference to the controversy between Presi-
dent Johnson and Judge Advocate General Holt over the
recommendation to mercy of Mrs. Surratt signed by a maj-
ority (five) of the commission which had sentenced her to
be executed.7
STUDENT: What is the origin of the military commission
in the United States?
PRoFEssoR: General Winfield Scott in his memoirs states
in reference to the Mexican War in 1847 that "Reliable in-
formation reached Washington almost daily that the wild
volunteers as soon as beyond the Rio Grande committed,
4 PrrANM, ofp. cit. supra note 2, at 250.
5 PmA1, op. cit. supra note 2, at 250.
6 1 TRIAm o JoHN H. SuRiATT (1867) 27.
7 Loc. cit. supra note 6.
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with impunity, all sorts of atrocities on the persons and prop-
erty of Mexicans, and that one of the former, from a con-
cealed position, had even shot a Mexican as he marched out
of Monterey, under the capitulation. There was no legal pun-
ishment for any of those offenses, for, by the strange omission
of Congress, American troops take with them beyond the
limits of their own country, no law but the Constitution of
the United States, and the rules and articles of war....
"To suppress these disgraceful acts abroad, the auto-
biographer drew up an elaborate paper, in the form of an
order... called, his martial law order.., to be issued and
enforced in Mexico, until Congress could be stimulated to
legislate on the subject. On handing this paper to the Sec-
retary of War for his approval, a startle at the title was the
only comment he then or ever made on the subject. It was
soon silently returned, as too explosive for handling. A little
later the Attorney-General called and asked for a copy, and
the law officer of the Government, whose business it is to
speak on all such matters, was stricken with legal dumbness.
All the authorities were evidently alarmed at the proposi-
tion to establish martial law, even in a foreign country, oc-
cupied by American troops. Hence they touched the subject
as daintily as a 'terrier mumbles a hedgehog.' . . . Under
it, all offenders, Americans and Mexicans, were alike pun-
ished with death for murder or rape, and for other crimes
proportionately. It will be seen that the order did not in the
least interfere with the administration of justice between
Mexican and Mexican, by the ordinary courts of the coun-
try. It only provided a special American tribunal for any
case to which an American might be a party." 8
STUDENT: Why did President Johnson order a military
commission to be convoked to try the civilians accused of
being leagued with John Wilkes Booth in the assassination
of President Lincoln?
8 MEMOIRS OF LIEUT.-GENERA ScoTT (1864) 392-39S.
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PROFESSOR: Secretary of War Stanton decided that the
conspirators should be tried by a military commission and
Attorney-General Speed thereupon advised President John-
son that such a tribunal had jurisdiction.9 In the diary of
Gideon Welles is an observation that throws further light on
this matter and permits an inference that Secretary of the
Navy Welles thought that Speed at first was of the opinion
that the conspirators should be tried in the Criminal Court
of the District of Columbia. Welles, in his diary, states: "I
regret they are not tried by the civil court, and so expressed
myself, as did McCullough (McCullough was Secretary of
the Treasury); but Stanton, who says the proof is clear and
positive, was emphatic, and Speed advised a military com-
mission, though at first, I thought, otherwise inclined." 1'
Orville Hickman Browning, in his diary, states: "This com-
mission was without authority, and its proceedings
void. . ." "' It is rather interesting to note Mr. Pierrepont's
statement to the jury in the subsequent trial of John Sur-
ratt, in 1867, in the District of Columbia Criminal Court:
"This, gentlemen [referring to the jury], as I have already
said, is a trial of one of those conspirators. It has this marked
feature in it: it is the first judicial trial that has ever been
instituted to try any of these conspirators. Our freedom-lov-
ing race and the sturdy blood from which we spring has al-
ways clung with exceeding fondness to liberty . . . to the
right of trial by jury in a court of law, and they have always
been jealous of military power. When the other conspira-
tors were tried, it was claimed that as the head of the United
States had been murdered in his camp, it was eminently
fit that the trial of those conspirators should be held by
military men. Many said that in the city of Washington
there was so much feeling and sympathy for the rebel cause,
9 PIT.W, op. cit. supra note 2, at 403.
10 2 DIARYr OF GIDEON WFLLES (1911) 303 (May 9, 1865). Mr. Wright Howes
of Chicago called this to my attention.
11 22 DmyA OF ORvInF HcKMAN BRowxmxa (Illinois Historical Collection)
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there were so many enemies of our country here, that the
chances were that a jury would not be found among whose
number there would not be some one or two in sympathy
with the traitor and the assassin, who would prevent a ver-
dict. That argument was used in favor of the military tribu-
nal, instead of a trial in the courts of law. I am one of those
who at all times, and upon all occasions, have insisted that
the civil courts, with a jury of twelve men, were competent
to the trial of these crimes," 2 Mr. Pierrepont was Associate
Counsel for the United States in the prosecution against
John Surratt.
STUDENT: If the Military Commission had no jurisdic-
tion of the defendants as they claimed, why didn't they ap-
ply for a writ of habeas corpus?
PROFESSOR: Mary E. Surratt, one of the defendants, ap-
plied for a writ of habeas corpus on the day set for her exe-
cution and Judge Wylie of the Supreme Court of the Dis-
trict of Columbia ordered a writ to issue as prayed and made
it returnable before the Criminal Court of the District of
Columbia at 10 A. M., July 7th, 1865.*At 11:30 the same
morning, Major General Hancock, accompanied by Attorney-
General Speed, appeared before Judge Wylie in obedience to
the writ, but refused to produce the body of Mary E. Sur-
ratt as President Johnson, that morning, suspended the writ
in this case and Judge Wylie ruled that the court yielded
to the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus by the Presi-
dent of the United States."3
STUDENT: Should Judge Wylie have yielded to the mili-
tary jurisdiction in this case?
12 2 TRiAL OF JonN H. SuRRaA, 1258.
18 Pi'M AN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 250. Hugh McCulloch, Secretary of the
Treasury in Administrations of Lincoln, Johnson, and Arthur, in a volume entitled
"Men and Measures of Half a Century" (New York, 1888, Charles Scribner &
Sons) referring, on page 226, to President Johnson, said: "And that he especially
regretted that he ordered the writ of habeas corpus, issued by Judge Wylie, on
the morning of her execution, to be disregarded."
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PROFESSOR: Judge Wylie should not have yielded in this
case according to my interpretation of the law, but should
have ordered General Hancock to obey the order and ignore
the suspension of the writ and have acted just as Lord Kil-
warden, a great constitutional judge, did in Wolfe Tone's
case. Wolfe Tone had been sentenced to death by an order
of a military court and, on the morning set for his execution,
his counsel applied for a writ of habeas corpus, stating: "I
do not pretend that Mr. Tone is not guilty of the charge of
which he is accused. I presume the officers were honorable
men. But it is stated in this affidavit as a solemn fact that
Mr. Tone had no commission under His Majesty, and,
therefore, no court-martial could have cognizance of any
crime imputed to him while the Court of King's Bench sat
in the capacity of the great Criminal Court of the land. In
times when war was raging, when man was opposed to man
in the field, courts-martial might be endured; but every law
authority is with me, while I stand upon the sacred and
immutable principle of the Constitution, that martial law
and civil law are incompatible, and that the former must
cease with the existence of the latter. This is not, however,
the time for arguing this momentous question. My client
must appear in this court. He is cast for death this very
day. He may be ordered for execution while I address you.
I call on the court to support the law, and move for a writ
of habeas corpus, to be directed to the provost marshal
of'the barracks and Major Sandys, to bring up the body of
Tone." The Chief Justice thereupon said: "Have a writ in-
stantly prepared and Mr. Sheriff proceed to the barracks
and acquaint the provost marshal that a writ is preparing
to suspend Mr. Tone's execution, and see that he be not
executed." The military officers refused to obey the writ and
the Chief Justice said: "Mr. Sheriff, take the body of Tone
into custody. Take the provost marshal and Major Sandys
into custody, and show the order of the court to General
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Craig." "4 In the United States the noted decision of Chief
Justice Taney in the Merryman case in 1863 and the land-
mark Milligan decision in 1866 and the early opinion in
1807 in the Bollman and Swartwout proceedings by Chief
Justice Marshall point to the fact that Judge Wylie did not
have to yield. The problem is extremely important because
in final analysis it involves the proper functions of the judi-
cial department as well as the line of demarcation between
the three departments of our government. The supremacy
of the judiciary should be, as a matter of principle, upheld
at all times.
STUDENT: In the cases in which civilians are tried by
a military court, it is always contended that a civil court
has jurisdiction and it would seem as though the civilian
ought to have that question decided by a judicial tribunal.
PROFESSOR: Today a recent statute known as the Feder-
al Declaratory Judgments Act (Signed June 14, 1934) pro-
vides a remedy for a civilian who denies the jurisdiction of
the military authorities over him, as it permits a person to
obtain a declaration of his rights and "In cases of actual
controversy the courts of the United States shall have pow-
er, upon petition, declaration, complaint, or other appro-
priate pleadings to declare rights and other legal relations
of any interested party petitioning for such declaration,
whether or not further relief is or could be prayed, and such
declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judg-
ment or decree and be reviewable as such." 11 In an English
case, which shows the possibilities of the declaratory judg-
ment in this field, a party asked for a declaration that he
was not obliged to comply with a military notice and that it
was illegal as to him. 6
14 27 Howau.'s STATE TRIALS (1820) 614.
15 BORCHARD'S DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1934) 634.
16 BORCHARD'S DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, 615; Flint v. Attorney General
[1918] 2 Ch. 50.
General T. M. Harris, one of the members of the military commission that
tried the conspirators, published a volume on the trial in 1892. At page 110 it is
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STUDENT: Jefferson Davis was captured on May 11,
1865, and imprisoned in Fort Monroe and indicted for trea-
son. Why was he not tried?
PROFESSOR: That question has never been satisfactorily
answered but an interpretation of DeWitt, in his Impeach-
ment and Trial of President Andrew Johnson states: "As to
the indictment, the real causes of. delay were the refusal of
the Chief Justice to hold court in Virginia while the mili-
tary held even partial control of the state, mistrust of a Vir-
ginia jury, and the desire to avoid the opening of embarrass-
ing. constitutional questions which the defendant's counsel
were sure to raise on the trial. The President was in no way
responsible for the tardiness of the prosecution; on the con-
trary, he, probably, was the only member of the administra-
tion having no misgivings as to its success. As to the charge
of complicity, the real cause of delay in pressing it was that
the testimony on which it was based-taken in secret be-
fore the military commission-in its subject matter was of
the most flimsy and inconclusive character, was incompetent
under the most elementary rules of evidence and came from
the mouths of professional witnesses testifying under pay." 17
STUDENT: What did the people of the United States
think about the situation?
PROFESSOR: There were two schools of thought extant.
On June 11, 1866, one month after the capture of Jefferson
Davis, the following resolution was offered in the House of
Representatives by Mr. Boutwell of Massachusetts, which
was agreed to-yeas 105, nays 19-to this effect: "Whereas
it is notorious that Jefferson Davis was the leader of the late
rebellion, and is guilty of treason under the laws of the
United States; and whereas by the proclamation of the
stated: "To the executive department of the government alone belonged the de-
cision of the question as to the kind of trial that the accused should have....1"
Is that an executive question under the Constitution? See General O'Duffy's Case
[1934] Irish Rep. 550
i7 DEWrrr's I10EACHUMNT AND TiAL OP PRESmENT ANDREw JoHNsoN
(1903) -137.
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President of May, 1865, the said Davis was charged with
complicity in the assassination of President Lincoln, and
said proclamation has not been revoked or annulled: There-
fore, Be it resolved, As the opinion of the House of Repre-
sentatives, that said Davis should be held in custody as a
prisoner, and subjected to a trial according to the laws of the
land."'
STUDENT: Didn't the decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States in the Milligan case make it clear that
military commissions had no jurisdiction over civilians where
the courts were open and functioning?
PROFESSOR: All are not agreed on the meaning of the
Milligan case,' 9 but it seems as though the prevailing opinion
is that the majority of the court were correct. Some claim
the case to be limited by the fact that the majority of the
court claimed to have "judicial knowledge that in Indiana,
in time of war, the Federal authority was always unopposed,
and its courts always open to hear criminal accusations, and
redress grievances." 20 It is contended that the fact assumed
by the majority of the court was really a political question
and if the executive department had declared that the State
of Indiana and the Federal courts were subject to military
jurisdiction on account of war, the courts would have been
bound to recognize the military order. In a recent inter-
pretation by John M. Zane, in Lincoln The Constitutional
Lawyer, it is stated: "It was plain under the law that Mil-
ligan was entitled to be discharged under the Act of Con-
gress then in force, and that he had not, therefore, been law-
fully tried by the military commission." (Page 87.) In dis-
cussing the opinion of the majority in that case though,
Justice Davis, according to the author, went too far, as he
18 MCPHERSON'S HAND-BooK OF PoLTIrcs Poa 1868, 113. A nolle prosequi
was entered on the treason indictment, December, 1868 (U. S. Cir. Ct. at Rich-
mond.).
19 4 Wall. 2 (1866).
20 Wmia's WAR PowERs UNDEa THE CoNsmn TIoN (43rd ed. 1871) 460,
contains an extensive critique of the Milligan case.
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states: "The rule laid down by Justice Davis cannot be con-
sidered sound." (Page 88.)
STUDENT: Is my understanding correct as to the fact
that a majority of the military commission signed a recom-
mendation of mercy in behalf of Mary E. Surratt, one of the
four conspirators they had found guilty and sentenced to be
executed?
PROFESSOR: Yes, it is true that five members of the nine
that constituted the commission signed such a recommenda-
tion 2 and no incident connected with the conspiracy trial
created more general interest than the controversy between
President Johnson and Judge Advocate General Holt about
it. President Johnson would not admit that he saw the com-
mission's recommendation when he approved the findings of
the commission and ordered the execution to be carried out.
Judge Advocate General Holt was positive that the record
of the conspiracy trial presented to President Johnson by
him for approval had attached to it the recommendation of
mercy. To this day two schools of thought exist in reference
to this matter.
STUDENT: Why was it that the diary of Booth was not
mentioned in the conspiracy trial of 1865 but was brought
forward in the trial of John Surratt in 1867?
PROFESSOR: A veil of mystery surrounds the story of
Booth's diary. In 1865 the fact that a diary was taken from
Booth at the time of his capture was not made public and
only a limited few knew about it; but in 1867 the public was
made conscious of the diary due to the fact that La Fayette
C. Baker, Chief of the United States Secret Service, in his
testimony before the Judicial Committee of the Impeach-
ment Investigation of President Johnson, mentioned Booth's
diary. Baker likewise published a History of the United
States Secret Service in 1867 in which he said that he took
Booth's effects, including his diary, to Secretary of War
21 1 TnAx oF Jomu H. S u r, 27.
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Stanton on Wednesday, April 26, 1865.22 Another incident
that occurred in March, 1867, pyramided the status of the
diary episode. The Congressional Globe details how General
Butler from Massachusetts and Mr. John A. Bingham of
Ohio differed on the policy of reconstruction relief and Gen-
eral Butler practically said, among other caustic remarks,
that Mr. Bingham was opposing the policy of the President.
Mr. Bingham, who had been very active as Special Judge
Advocate in the conspiracy trial of 1865, resented the re-
marks of General Butler and caused the members present to
break into laughter by reflecting on the military ability of
General Butler by referring to him as either the hero of Fort
Fisher not taken or Fort Fisher taken.23 This statement
roiled General Butler and five days later he replied to Mr.
Bingham and referred to the conspiracy trial and the fact
that the diary was not brought forward and said: "That
diary as now produced, has eighteen pages cut out . . 24
General Butler inferred that Mr. Bingham, as Special Judge
Advocate in the conspiracy trial, had not fully performed
his duty but excepted from this accusation the nine members
of the Military Commission by the following remark that
is significant in showing the secrecy that surrounded Booth's
diary: "They did not see the diary. They did not know of
the diary." "-' Four months later the trial of John Surratt for
the murder of President Lincoln started in June and accord-
ing to the record of that trial on June 11, 1867, Mr. Pierre-
pont, Special Assistant Prosecutor, stated that the news-
•2 See, also: 2 TRIAL OF JOHN H. SURRTr. 1321, 1368; GENERAL HARRIS'
TRIAL OF THE CONSPIRATORS (1892) 114; PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS Or THE WAR
OF THE REBELLION, published by the Commandery of the Loyal Legion of the
United States (1891) 211; BURNETT, THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN PRESIDENT
JOHNSON AND JUDGE HOLT; BAKER'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERV-
ICE, 540. Cf. 1 TRIAL OF JOHN H. SURRATT, 311 (Testimony of Everton J. Conger:
"Q. To whom did you give that diary with the other articles?" "A. To the Sec-
retary of War, Mr. Stanton."). Also, see, 2 TRIAL OF JOHN H. SuRRATT, 1206,
1229, 1236.
23 38 CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE (1867) 262, 263.
24 38 CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE, 363.
25 38 CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE, 364.
LINCOLN CONSPIRACY TRIAL
papers stories circulated the last few days as to the reason
the diary was not brought forward in the conspiracy trial
of 1865 would now be proved false.2" On June 25, 1867,
Everton J. Conger took the stand as a witness and said that
he thought he took the diary from Booth.27 Conger further
stated he read the diary carefully before giving it to Secre-
tary of War Stanton and that it was for the year 1864 and
that although some leaves were cut out it nevertheless con-
tained some writing.28 In reply to a question about whether
the diary was shown to him when he was a witness in the
conspiracy trial two years previously, Conger said: "I have
no recollection of seeing it, or of having anything said to me
about it." 29 The diary was then introduced and the entries
read as follows: "Te amo.
"April 13, 14, Friday, The Ides.
"Until to-day nothing was ever thought of sacrificing to
our country's wrongs. For six months we had worked to cap-
ture. But our cause being almost lost, something decisive and
great must be done. .. " " In the trial of John Surratt the
defendant contended that the statement in the diary above
quoted showed the time when the conspiracy was formed and
that the plans were changed without his knowledge by
Booth. Following its use in the 1867 trial the diary was re-
turned to the government archives without the mystery of
the eighteen missing pages being solved.
STUDENT: What was the case of Shuey v. United States?
PROFESSOR: On the 20th of April, 1865, the Secretary
of War offered for the apprehension of John H. Surratt, one
of Booth's accomplices, $25,000 reward, and also that "a
liberal reward" would be paid for any information conducive
26 1 Tim or JoHN H. SuRxATr, 27.
27 38 CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE, 312.
28 38 CoNGRESsIoNAL GLOBF, 308. Conger was asked: "Q. State whether the
diary is in the same condition now as when you first saw it? A. Yes sir." Cf.
Note 22, supra.
29 38 CoNGPESSIoNAL GLOBE, 314.
80 38 CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE, 310.
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to the arrest of Surratt. On November 24th, 1865, the Presi-
dent caused to be published an order revoking the reward
offered for the arrest of John H. Surratt. Henry B. Ste.
Marie, in April, 1866, recognized Surratt and gave informa-
tion to Mr. King, the American minister at Rome, that Zou-
ave Watson was in fact John H. Surratt. Although Surratt
then escaped to Egypt, it was recognized that the disclosures
made by Ste. Marie brought about his arrest. Ste. Marie
was paid $10,000 by the United States and then sued for
$15,000 in the Court of Claims on the ground that balance
was due him of the reward of $25,000 offered by the Secre-
tary of War. The claim for $15,000 was not allowed, because
the reward offered had been revoked five months before
Ste. Marie had given the information."
STUDENT: Were there any other legal trials that arose
as an aftermath of the Lincoln Conspiracy Trial?
PROFESSOR: In 1866 the Milligan case led the conspira-
tors who had been sentenced to the Federal prison in Florida
to believe that their incarceration in 1865 was illegal and
that they could obtain their freedom by a writ of habeas
corpus. In 1868 following the Amnesty Proclamation more
hope arose in the breasts of the conspirators and Doctor
Mudd sought his release but District Judge Boynton in
Florida refused to recognize his request on the ground that
he had committed a military crime and further that the
Amnesty Proclamation of 1868 did not extend to his case."
31 Shuey v. United States, 92 U. S. 73 (1875). The Supreme Court said: "We
agree with the Court of Claims, that the service rendered by the plaintiff's testa-
tor was, not the apprehension of John IT. Surratt, for which the War Department
had offered a reward of $25,000, but giving information that conduced to the
arrest. These are quite distinct things, though one may have been a consequence
of the other. The proclamation of the Secretary of War treated them as different;
and, while a reward of $25,000 was offered for the apprehension, the offer for the
information was only a 'liberal reward."'
Professor Sherman Steele called my attention to this case.
32 Ex parte Mudd, 17 Fed. Cas. 954 (1868). (Case No. 9,899.) In 1934 a
bill was introduced in Congress to give Dr. Mudd's daughter, now living in Den-
ver, $100,000.
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STUDENT: Why was the trial of the conspirators in 1865
and the trial of John H. Surratt in 1867?
PROFESSOR: At the time the military commission was
convoked in May, 1865, John H. Surratt, the friend and
associate of Booth, had fled from Washington and no trace
of him was dicovered until 1866. When he was captured
finally in Egypt and brought back to the United States, it
was 1867 and in June of that year he was tried alone in the
District of Columbia Criminal Court by a jury and not by a
military commission. No doubt you will recall that the jury
disagreed and some months later he was set free.
STUDENT: If John H. Surratt was so closely associated
with the archconspirator, Booth, I cannot understand why
he was set free, although his mother, Mary E. Surratt, was
hanged?.
PROFESSOR: The jury did not find John H. Surratt guilty,
but the military commission found sufficient evidence to con-
vict Mary E. Surratt.
STUDENT: In conflicts between the civil and military
jurisdiction, does the civil, as a matter of law, always pre-
vail?
PROFESSOR: The military jurisdiction is supreme in its
own sphere and the case of United States v. McDonald 11 is
enlightening on that point where a court martial was prop-
erly held to have jurisdiction to try a spy arrested in New
York City. It seems no matter how clear the point of juris-
diction may be, the matter is invariably sought to be brought
into a civil court. In the first. mutiny in the United States
Navy, for example, there was no doubt about the jurisdic-
tion of the court-martial held at the navy yard in Brooklyn,
but the following detail shows that the civil jurisdiction was
sought: "In the case of Mackenzie, Commander of the
83 265 Fed. 754 (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1920), appeal dismissed, 41 S. Ct. 35,
256 U. S. 705, 65 L. ed. 1180.
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United States Brig Somers, who, in December, 1842, had
caused an officer and two men to be executed for mutiny,
and who was tried by a court-martial on the charge of mur-
der, and acquitted, the question arose, whether the case was
exclusively within the jurisdiction of a court-martial. Ap-
plication was twice made to the Circuit Court, while the
court-martial was in session, to take jurisdiction of the case;
but, after full argument, the application was denied. And
the reasoning of the Court went the length of sustaining the
principle, that courts-martial in the army and navy have
exclusive jurisdiction of the offenses committed in violation
of their respective codes." "
STUDENT: The Lincoln Conspiracy Trial and its various
phases now appears in a different light since you have used
it to illustrate the difficulty that arises where a constitutional
problem remains unsettled, but before you conclude I would
like to ask you one or two questions.
PROFESSOR: Let us save a little of the night share for the
morning, as Professor Meehan would say.
34 WALKER's AMERICAN LAw (6th ed. 1874) 167. In a pamphlet published
in New York in 1843, entitled "Case of the Somers' Mutiny," the defense of
Alexander Mackenzie, Commander of the U. S. Brig Somers, before the court-
martial held at the Navy Yards, Brooklyn, stated: "In judging of the necessity
of the execution, it is of vital importance to ascertain preliminary, whether a
mutinous conspiracy in fact existed on board the Somers, and whether the per-
sons executed were parties to that conspiracy. That such conspiracy existed; that
it had for its object the conversion of the Brig into a piratical cruiser; that
such object was to be effected by the murder of the officers and faithful of the
crew; and that Mr. Spencer and Small were not only parties but ring leaders, in
the conspiracy-appears from their own repeated and solemn declaration, and
from unequivocal documentary evidence." (Page 3.) The execution of three of
the prime conspirators at sea was justified because "The Commander of a ship
at sea cannot, like a commander on shore, invoke the aid of some neighboring
troops, or appeal to the patriotism of the sturdy militia . .. a mutiny on land
does not always vitally endanger the interests or the fame of .the country." (Page
10.) "Under these circumstances what was the Commander of the Somers to do?




The Lincoln Conspiracy Trial in 1865 and the contro-
versies that have arisen as a result of it cannot be attributed
to the fact that the people believed that the co-conspirators
of Booth should not be punished. Rather, they have arisen
because the trial was by a military commission instead of by
a common law jury in a criminal court and because the trial
was secret, rather than public, as the founding fathers in-
tended when the Bill of Rights was added to the Constitu-
tion. In other words the trial proceeded on the theory that
in conflicts between the military and civil powers, the mili-
tary was supreme, which in the United States is an anach-
ronism as the Milligan case, decided by the Supreme Court
of the United States in 1866, evidences. "The Constitution
of the United States is a law for rules and people, equally in
war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection
all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances.
No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was
ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its pro-
visions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies
of government." " Mr. Justice Stephen J. Field some years
later, in referring to the Milligan case, said: "The decision
of the Court was in favor of the liberty of the citizen. Its
opinion was announced by Mr. Justice Davis, and it will
stand as perpetual monument to his honor. It laid down in
clear and unmistakable terms the doctrine that military
commission organized during the war, in a state not invaded
nor engaged in rebellion, in which the federal courts were
open and in the undisturbed exercise of their judicial func-
tions, had no jurisdiction to try a citizen who was not a
35 Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L. ed. 281 (1866).
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resident of a state in rebellion, nor a prisoner of war, nor a
person in the military or naval service; and that Congress
could not invest them with any such power; and that in
states where the courts were thus open and undisturbed
the guaranty of trial by jury contained in the Constitution
was intended for a state of war as well as state of peace, and
is equally binding upon rulers and people at all times and
under all circumstances." 36 All things considered, it seems
difficult to reconcile the Lincoln Conspiracy Trial with the
fundamental guaranties of the Constitution unless one re-
fers to that old adage, "hard cases make bad law."
John W. Curran.
De Paul University, College of Law.
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